Institutional	Legitimacy* N.	P.	Adams Philosophy,	Goethe	University	Frankfurt Our	current	understanding	of	the	idea	of	legitimacy	is	deeply	connected	to	the	peculiarly modern	political	institution	of	the	nation-state.1	But	questions	of	legitimacy	have	moved beyond	the	state.	It	is	now	common	to	examine	the	legitimacy	of	institutions	such	as	the European	Union, international	courts, international	human	rights institutions,	or those focused	on	specific	issues,	like	the	World	Trade	Organization	or	particular	transnational non-governmental organizations.2 As our traditional state-centric understanding of legitimacy is applied to these new modes of governance and new varieties of institutions,	however,	it is	becoming	increasingly	strained.	The	concepts	and	standards developed in response to the problems of a much less globalized, much more Westphalian	world	may	be	inadequate	for	the	contemporary	context. Theorists	have	responded	to	this	tension	in	two	general	ways.3	One	strategy	is	to take a traditional state-centric understanding of political legitimacy and modify it as * My	thanks	to	Merten	Reglitz,	Antoinette	Scherz,	and	Cord	Schmelzle	for	their	feedback	on	this	paper	and for	many incisive conversations on this topic. An early version of this argument was presented at the workshop	"International	Legitimacy	and	Law"	at	Goethe	University	Frankfurt	in	July	2015;	thanks	to	the organizer	and	audience	for	the	discussion.	In	addition,	thanks	also	to	three	anonymous	reviewers	of	this journal	for	their	helpful	comments	and	suggestions. 1	The	term	'legitimate'	gets	used	in	a	huge	variety	of	ways,	often	simply	to	mean	"justified."	My	account	is not	meant	to	capture	all	of	the	many	ways	the	language	of	legitimacy	is	applied.	Section	one	outlines	the sense of the term that I am interested in; as	will be clear,	my concern is with the normative sense of legitimacy,	not	the	dependent	descriptive	or	sociological	sense. 2 Here is an extremely incomplete but somewhat representative sampling to illustrate the variety of international	legitimacy	claims	that	are	being	made	in	an	increasingly	large	literature.	On	the	EU:	Andreas Føllesdal,	"The	Legitimacy	Deficits	of	the	European	Union,"	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	14	(2006),	441468;	Jürgen	Neyer,	"Europe's	Justice	Deficit:	Justification	and	Legitimacy	in	the	European	Union,"	Political Theory of the European	Union,	ed. by Jürgen	Neyer and	Antje	Wiener (Oxford:	Oxford	University Press, 2011), pp. 169-186; on international law: John Tasioulas, "The Legitimacy of International Law," The Philosophy	of International	Law, ed.	by	Samantha	Besson	and John	Tasioulas (Oxford:	Oxford	University Press,	2010),	pp.	97-116;	Thomas	Christiano, "Democratic	Legitimacy	and International Institutions," in Besson	and	Tasioulas,	The	Philosophy	of	International	Law,	pp.	119-137;	Allen	Buchanan,	"The	Legitimacy of International Law," in Besson and Tasioulas, The Philosophy of International Law, pp. 79-96; Christopher	A.	Thomas,	"The	Uses	and	Abuses	of	Legitimacy	in	International	Law,"	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal Studies,	34 (2014), 729-758; Daniel Bodansky, "The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International	Environmental	Law?"	The	American Journal	of International	Law,	93 (1999), 596-624; on human rights: The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes, ed. by Andreas Føllesdal,	Johan	Karlsson	Schaffer,	and	Geir	Ulfstein	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014);	Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); on more specific institutions: Richard Higgott and Eva Erman, "Deliberative global governance and the question of legitimacy:	what	can	we	learn	from	the	WTO?"	Review	of	International	Studies,	36	(2010),	449-470;	Vivien Collingwood,	"Non-governmental	organisations,	power,	and	legitimacy	in	international	society,"	Review	of International Studies,	32 (2006), 439-454; finally, on the entire global system, see Allen Buchanan and Robert	O.	Keohane,	"The	Legitimacy	of	Global	Governance	Institutions,"	Ethics	and	International	Affairs,	20 (2006),	405-437;	Ian	Clark,	"Legitimacy	in	a	Global	Order,"	Review	of	International	Studies,	29	(2003),	7595. 3	Cf.	Samantha	Besson,	"The	Authority	of	International	Law	–	Lifting	the	State	Veil,"	Sydney	Law	Review,	31 (2009),	343-380	at	p.	349.	I	ignore	the	more	radically	skeptical	option	of	rejecting	the	notion	of	legitimacy altogether. 2 little	as	possible	when	applying	it	to	the	wide	variety	of	international	institutions.4	The other	strategy	is	to	posit	a	novel	notion	of	political	legitimacy	that	is	distinct	from	state legitimacy	and	applies	to	some	set	of	international	institutions.5 The	point	of	this	paper	is	to	suggest	that	a	third,	more	revisionary	strategy	should be pursued: begin at a higher level of generality with the question of institutional legitimacy.	I	argue	for	an	underlying	notion	of	legitimacy	that	applies	to	all	institutions, political or otherwise. Understanding this underlying notion	will illuminate the	more particular	case	of	political	institutions	in	all	their	variety. My aims here are primarily exploratory; I intend to open up new avenues for theorizing	without	claiming	to	have fully	stepped	down	those	paths.	My	hope is that	a new	approach to the	question	of legitimacy	will	not	only	be	useful for the	burgeoning concern	with	international	institutions	but	will	also	force	us	to	revise	our	understanding of what it means for states to be legitimate.	Whether that hope will be realized is a question	for	further	down	the	line. In section one I argue for a practical approach to legitimacy, showing that it captures a type of moral standing that allows people to coordinate their practical responses to institutions and institutional demands. I conclude that legitimacy must capture	an	institution's	right	to	function	without	coercive	interference.	This	leads	me	to analyze legitimacy	by	analogy	to individuals' rights to	non-interference in	section	two, focusing	on the idea	of	rights forfeiture. In	section three I	consider the implications	of my	general	approach	for	questions	of	political	legitimacy.	Finally,	in	section	four	I	apply this approach to the particular case of the state and show how a minimalist understanding	of state legitimacy is both	plausible and	opens	up	new	possibilities for understanding	our	relation	to	the	state. I.	A	New	Concept	of	Legitimacy As	standardly	conceived,	legitimacy	is	the	right	to	rule:	a	legitimate	state	has	the	right	to rule and an illegitimate state does not. The nature of this right is widely contested, variously	taking	the	form	of	a	claim-right,6	a	power-right,7	or	a	liberty-right.8	Theorists disagree	about	what	sort	of	standing	legitimacy	constitutes	(e.g.	claim,	power,	or	liberty) as	well	as	what	sort	of	"uptake"	legitimacy	demands	of	others	(e.g.	a	duty	of	obedience 4	For	example,	Tasioulas, "The	Legitimacy	of International	Law"	and	Christiano, "Democratic	Legitimacy and International Institutions"	both follow this strategy	by	directly applying frameworks	developed for states	(a	Razian	approach	and	democratic	theory,	respectively)	to	questions	about	non-state	institutions. Also see Ronald Dworkin, "A New Philosophy for International Law," Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41 (2013),	2-30. 5	See	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights;	Higgott	and	Erman,	"Deliberative	global	governance	and	the question of legitimacy: what can we learn from the WTO?"; Collingwood, "Non-governmental organisations, power, and legitimacy in international society," p. 452. Distinguishing between the strategies is often difficult, in part because of disagreement about what is central to the concept of legitimacy	and	what	instead	falls	under	particular	conceptions. 6 See, e.g., A. John Simmons,	Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton, University Press 1979); Andrew	Altman and Christopher	Heath	Wellman,	A Liberal Theory of International Justice (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009);	Christopher	W.	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the	Modern	State	(Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press,	1998). 7 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and The Morality of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Arthur Isak Applbaum, "Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey," Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs,	38	(2010),	215-239;	Merten	Reglitz, "Political	Legitimacy	Without	a	(Claim-) Right	to	Rule,"	Res	Publica,	21	(2015),	291-307. 8	Robert	Ladenson,	"In	Defense	of	a	Hobbesian	Conception	of	Law,"	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs,	9	(1980), 134-159.	Ladenson	uses	'justification-right'. 3 or deference, a liability, or the lack of a claim).9 Despite these differences, theorists following	the	traditional	approach	all	focus	on	ruling	because	their	object	of	analysis	is the	state.	Whatever	else	it	does,	the	state	issues	rules	in	the	form	of	laws	and	coercively enforces those rules. The question of whether the state is legitimate becomes the question of	whether it has the standing to issue and enforce rules in the	ways that it does. It	is	clear	why	it	is	difficult	to	apply	considerations	of	legitimacy	to	international institutions on the standard approach. The territorially-bound, force-monopolizing, sovereignty-claiming	state is	very	different from	the international	political institutions that	increasingly	characterize	our	world.10	These	institutions	rule	in	a	very	different	way from	the	state,	if	they	rule	at	all.11	The	rules	of	international	law	are	very	different	from the rules	of	domestic law; the	methods	of enforcement, insofar as they exist, are very different	as	well.	The conceptions	and	standards	of legitimacy that	were	developed to answer	the	question	of	whether	a	state	has	the	right	to	rule	do	not	seem	applicable	to institutions	that	do	not	rule	in	the	way	states	rule. The revisionary strategy I am	pursuing	here asks	us to reject the very starting point of the traditional approach, namely the focus on ruling.12 But if	we	do	not start with rule, where do we begin? Here I follow (and modify) Allen Buchanan's general strategy, which takes a practical approach to legitimacy by asking what we use evaluations	of	legitimacy	for.	We	evaluate	institutions	in	a	huge	variety	of	ways,	asking whether they	are just,	or fair,	or respectful, and	so	on.	Among this	variety the	distinct role	of	legitimacy	is	to	solve	what	Buchanan	calls	the	metacoordination	problem.13 Institutions	solve	first	order	coordination	problems	by	providing	shared	signals and	norms	that	coordinate	individuals'	behavior	and	thereby	enable	us	to	attain	a	wide variety	of	goods	that	would	otherwise	be	unavailable.	Buchanan	is focused	on	political goods like providing for basic needs or protection from standard threats. However, institutions are also indispensable for the attainment of non-political goods, most obviously the goods of free association that arise when people exercise their autonomous	choices	about	whom	to	associate	with	and	how	to	associate	with	them. But	institutions	can	only	function,	and	so	these	goods	can	only	be	attained,	under certain	conditions.	The	main	problem	is	disagreement.	We	disagree	about	what	sorts	of goods	should	actually	be	pursued;	among	the	goods	we	agree	about,	we	disagree	about their	prioritization;	we	disagree	about	what	sorts	of	institutions	will	be	best	at	achieving those	goods.	We	disagree	about	when	we	should	abandon	an institution	as too flawed and	when	we	need	to	begin	anew;	we	disagree	about	what	sorts	of	aims	and	what	sorts of	institutional	methods	should	actively	be	suppressed.	Due	to	all	these	disagreements, 9 These classifications follow Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial	Reasoning	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1919). 10	For	insightful	discussion	on	defining	the	state	and	accompanying	challenges,	see	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the Modern	State. 11	See	Buchanan,	"The	Legitimacy	of	International	Law,"	pp.	81ff;	Christiano,	"Democratic	Legitimacy	and International Institutions." It is worth noting that the simplifying assumption that states rule in a distinctive	and	unified	manner	makes	a	contested	empirical	claim	and	may	indeed	be	false;	my	purpose	is not to	uphold this	assumption	but to	describe the literature	as it	exists.	As	will	become	clear in section three,	my	account	is	in	fact	quite	amenable	to	the	idea	that	there	is	no	unifying,	formal	understanding	of state rule.	While this could	be	devastating for some theories	of legitimacy,	particularly those that claim legitimacy	is	the	right	to	rule	in	some	particularly	technical	way,	it	works	well	with	my	general	approach that	focuses	on	rights	violations. 12 I am	not going to examine the	prospects for other strategies;	my claim is not that there are	no such prospects,	just	that	there	may	well	be	good	prospects	for	a	new,	revisionary	strategy. 13	For	the	fullest	and	most	recent	presentation	of	this,	see	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights,	especially chapter	five. 4 institutions would be unable to function if we were to each follow our own understanding of the good.	We	would support only those institutions that pursue the good	as	we	understand	it, in	the	order	we	prefer,	and	we	would	interfere	according	to our	own	lights.	Under	the	constant	threat	of	interference	and	the	uncertainty	of	conflict, institutions	would	be	unable	to	establish	the	sort	of	sustained,	predictable	coordination that	they	require	to	function	effectively	and	produce	goods	over	time. This	is	the	metacoordination	problem.	Institutions	enable	us	to	solve	first	order coordination	problems,	but institutions can	only function if	we solve the	higher	order coordination problem of how to unify our practical stances towards institutions themselves.	What	we	require	is	a	normative	standard	that	grants	institutions	the	space they need to function under conditions of pervasive, reasonable disagreement. Comprehensive	doctrines	of the	good	will	not	work	(and, for the	same	reason,	neither will	conceptions	of	justice).	We	need	a	less	demanding	and	less	controversial	alternative normative	standard.	Legitimacy	is	distinctive	because	it	is	able	to	play	this	role. Legitimacy solves the metacoordination problem by identifying which institutions	have	the	right	to	function.	On	the	traditional	approach,	legitimate	states	have the	right	to	rule	and	illegitimate	states	do	not.	On	the	more	general	approach	that	I	am following, legitimate	institutions	have	the	right	to	function	and	illegitimate	institutions do	not.	This right entitles legitimate institutions to	make	demands	on individuals that illegitimate	institutions	are	not	entitled	to	make:	specifically,	the	demands	that	must	be met	for	legitimate	institutions	to	function. We should take care that legitimacy captures only what institutions need and nothing	more	(especially	not	what	they	simply	claim	they	need).	The	more	we	build	into legitimacy, the more controversial it becomes and so the less able it is to play its distinctive role. Legitimacy needs to be as minimalist as possible in order solve the metacoordination	problem	under	conditions	of	deep	disagreement. The	first	step	in	understanding	what	institutions	need	to	function	is	to	consider how they function in general. Institutions are inherently normative, primarily constituted by people taking on institutional roles and thereby coordinating their behavior.14	Call	those	people	whom	accept	their	institutional	roles	and	so	act	according to the institutional norms that define their role "institutional insiders."15 For an institution	to	function	it	must	have	sufficiently	many	insiders	filling	a	sufficient	variety of	roles;	a	university,	for	example,	only	functions	when	there	are	sufficient	numbers	of both professors and students. It is only when enough people accept a variety of institutional roles that their	actions	become	sufficiently	coordinated for institutions to function	and	thereby	enable	us	to	attain	various	goods. This (notably non-technical) understanding of institutions leads us to the view that	legitimacy	correlates,	at	minimum,	to	a	duty	not	to	coercively	interfere	with	people accepting institutional roles	and	being	guided	by institutional	norms, i.e.	a	duty	not to coercively prevent people from being insiders to that institution.16 Such interference would prevent the institution from functioning, so would violate a legitimate 14	John	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice,	rev.	ed.	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1999),	pp.	47-48. 15	By	acceptance,	I	mean	something	like	adopting	the	internal	point	of	view	from	H.	L.	A.	Hart,	The	Concept of	Law	3rd	ed. (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	p.	89.	Someone	who	accepts	a system	of	norms takes	valid	norms	of	that	system	to	have	force	in	her	practical	deliberations.	I	set	aside	the	precise	nature of	that	force	or	the	psychological	basis	of	acceptance. 16	The	"coercively"	qualifier	is	necessary	because	some	forms	of	interference	will	not	be	ruled	out,	even	for legitimate	institutions,	depending	on	how	we	understand	interference.	One	firm	can	cause	a	rival	firm	to close	through	justified	market	competition	without	violating	the	rival	firm's	right	to	function.	For	ease	of use,	I	often	refer	to	an	institution's	right	to	function	without	interference,	where	the	"coercively"	qualifier is	implicit. 5 institution's	right	to	function. When legitimacy is understood to include the right to non-interference, it can play	the	role	that	we	identified	for	it	on	the	practical	approach.	There	are	many	different institutions, all of which make the minimal demand that we not interfere with their constitutive functioning. Those institutions allow a wide range of people to pursue a wide range of goods. In order to enable that pursuit, legitimacy has a dual purpose. Positively,	evaluations	of	legitimacy	protect	institutions	and	allow	them	to	achieve	their aims without the threat of destructive interference. Negatively, evaluations of (il)legitimacy identify which institutions	may be interfered	with; this negative role is especially important because some institutions are intent on domination, preventing others	from	living	together	and	pursuing	their	understanding	of	the	good. On	my	approach,	legitimacy	answers	a	very	specific	fundamental	question:	must we	allow	this	institution	to	carry	on,	or	may	we	coercively	interfere	with	it?	This	question lies at the core of every theory of legitimacy; a right to rule would be practically meaningless	if	the	institution	did	not	have	the	right	to	function	without	interference.	But I am making a stronger claim: legitimacy is only the right to function without interference.	(This	right	may	well	entail	further	Hohfeldian	advantages	when	applied	to particular cases due to the details of how a particular institution functions. The important point is that any further advantages follow only from the right to function without	interference.) Legitimacy is only the right to function	without interference	because that is all legitimacy needs to be to play the practical role we identified for it in solving the metacoordination problem. It enables us to coordinate our responses and allow institutions	the	space	to	function;	it	does	not	guarantee	their	individual	success.	But	this is	sufficient	because	people	are	motivated	for	a	wide	variety	of	reasons	to	contribute	to institutions	and	secure	the	goods	that	institutional	coordination	enables. Understanding legitimacy in such a minimalist manner is, of course, quite controversial. The rest of the paper explores the prospects of such an approach by applying it to a variety of problems that the traditional, more robust approach that focuses	on	state	legitimacy	is	ill-suited	to	solve.	I	put	off	application	to	the	state,	where the	minimalist	understanding	is	most	strained,	until	the	final	section. To	be	clear,	this	novel	understanding	of	legitimacy	does	not	on	its	own	result	in concrete	standards	of	legitimacy	for	particular	institutions.	It	must	be	combined	with	a robust understanding of the institutional context, importantly including how the institution	relates	to	the	end	it	is	structured	to	produce.	I	say	more	about	this	below,	but for	example:	the	state	is	often	thought	to	be	uniquely	necessary	for	the	achievement	of morally	mandatory	aims	like	exiting	the	state	of	nature,	whereas	the	Loyal	Order	of	the Moose is	only	one	among	many institutional	possibilities that	enable	us to	achieve	the voluntary goods of socializing and networking. How an institution functions dramatically impacts how we understand its right to function and what standards it needs to meet to have that right. We need standards of legitimacy for both kinds of institution	(some	social	clubs	are	illegitimate,	like	the	Ku	Klux	Klan,	and	so	lack	a	right	to non-interference),	but those standards	will	be radically	different	due to the important differences	in	the	institutions	themselves. II.	Evaluating	Institutional	Legitimacy Understanding legitimacy as the right to function leads us to a general strategy for considering	questions	of	institutional	legitimacy.	The	important	difference	between	this strategy	and	the	traditional	approach	is	that	I	put	aside	(for	now)	many	of	the	distinctive 6 features	of the	state that	make	state legitimacy	such	a	difficult	problem.	The	state, for example, holds territory over which it claims universal jurisdiction and in which it monopolizes coercive force. These features of the state are very relevant for the question	of	state	legitimacy	but	using	them	as	a	template	for	thinking	about	legitimacy in	general	is	misleading. If	legitimate	institutions	have	the	right	to	function	without	coercive	interference and institutions function via institutional insiders taking up their roles and acting on institutional	norms,	then	we	can	analyze	legitimacy	by	examining	the	conditions	under which insiders have the right to act as insiders without coercive interference. Considered in	the	abstract,	accepting	the	norms	of	an institutional	role	and	abiding	by them is not at all objectionable. (I consider the complicating issue of involuntary institutional participants below.) Because insiders are simply individuals, they have a standing	moral	right	to	non-interference	based	on	their	capacity	to	freely	exercise	their autonomy and choose the life they wish to live without coercive interference. Voluntarily	accepting	and	abiding	by	norms is	a	common, indeed	central,	part	of	all	of our lives. Thus institutions have a prima facie case for legitimacy simply because insiders' voluntary	acceptance	of collective	norms is a	permissible	act that falls	under their	individual	rights	of	autonomy	and	free	association. This insight suggests a strategy for evaluating legitimacy by	drawing a parallel between	individuals	and	institutions.	Individuals	generally	have	rights	against	coercive interference	in	their	actions	due	to	their	autonomy	and	self-determination.	However,	in some	circumstances	they	can	forfeit	those	rights.	For	example,	if	an	individual	attempts to	wrongfully	harm	someone,	they	forfeit	the	right	against	coercive	interference,	thereby becoming	liable	to	defensive	interference	and	correlatively	rendering	acts	in	defense	of the	victim	permissible.17 Institutions	are	made	up	of individuals	exercising their	right to free	association and	acting	on	the	basis	of	norms	they	freely	accept.	Just	as	in	the	case	of	individuals,	this means that institutions generally have the right to pursue their activities without interference. An institution's right against coercive interference is a function of the individual	rights	against	coercive	interference	that	its	insiders	have.18	However, just	as in	the	case	of individuals, the institution	can	forfeit these	rights.	When	it forfeits these rights, the institution is illegitimate. In that case, the institution can permissibly be coercively interfered with and insiders can permissibly be prevented from following institutional	norms.19 So	the	question	of	the	legitimacy	of	an	institution	becomes	the	question	of	under what conditions a group of individuals	who have freely joined together and accepted norms	to	shape	their	behavior	forfeit	their	rights	not	to	be	interfered	with	as	they	follow those	norms.	Generally	speaking	a	necessary	condition	of	rights	forfeiture	is	some	kind of	culpability	or	wrongdoing.	The	question, then, is	whether	the institution is	violating rights	or	culpably	risking	violating	rights.20 The identification of wrongdoing is only the first step, though. As with 17	See,	e.g.,	Jonathan	Quong,	"Killing	in	Self-Defense,"	Ethics,	119	(2009),	507-537. 18 I say "a function of" in order to remain agnostic about whether the institutional right is simply an agglomeration	of	individual	rights	or	if	there	is	an	emergent	collective	right	that	is	distinct.	I	want	to	avoid the difficult questions of collective agency and rights as much as possible. That said, I am a value individualist so I reject the	position that an institution	or collective of any	kind can	be an independent source	of	intrinsic	value	and	have	rights	that	are	not	"a	function	of"	the	rights	of	individuals. 19	Just	as	in	the	case	of	individuals,	the	in-principle	permissibility	of	interference	does	not	entail	that	any kind	of	interference	whatsoever	is	justified. 20 The distinction between	wrongdoing and culpability	will not	matter for our purposes here, so I	will simplify	the	discussion	by	considering	only	wrongdoing. 7 individuals, the mere presence of wrongdoing does not automatically forfeit a right against	coercive	interference.	Individuals	often	have	the	right	to	do	wrong,	meaning	they have	a	moral	right	against	the	coercive	interference	of	others	even	in	some	cases	when they	are	acting	morally	impermissibly.21	The	individual	right	to	do	wrong	is	grounded	in a	variety	of	concerns,	including	respect	for	autonomy	and	enabling	moral	maturation. Institutions	also	have	a	right	to	do	wrong	in	precisely	the	sense	that	a	single	act of	wrongdoing	does	not	necessarily forfeit their	right	against	coercive interference:	an institution might be acting wrongfully and yet still be legitimate. Similar concerns ground	the institutional	right to	do	wrong	as	ground	the individual	right to	do	wrong. First,	the	individual	right	to	do	wrong	of	institutional	insiders	and	the	respect	due	their autonomous choices surely secures, to some	degree, the right to do	wrong in concert with	others.	Second,	and	related to	moral	maturation, institutions	need	space to	make mistakes	and	reform	as	they	attempt	to	tackle	difficult	problems;	the	costs	of	allowing coercive interference in any institution that made a mistake are prohibitive under conditions of fallibility and would make achieving any complex and important aim impossible.22 Finally, it is worth noting that there are different kinds of coercive interference.	Wrongdoing	might	result	in	an	institution	forfeiting	rights	against	punitive interference	without	also	forfeiting	its	right	to	function	more	generally. To sum up: legitimate institutions have a right to function that correlates to a duty	of	non-interference.	As	with	individuals,	this	right	to	non-interference	can	be	forfeit if	the	institution	commits	sufficiently	egregious	wrongs	(although	not	any	wrong	will	do, given	the	right	to	do	wrong).	If	we	apply	this	to	some	particular	cases,	we	see	that	this notion	of	institutional	legitimacy	is	both	plausible	and	informative. An	opening	caveat:	you	may	well	disagree	with	my	evaluations	of	these	particular cases.	I	motivate	my	claims	to	some	degree,	but	the	overall	point	of	considering	cases	is to	confirm	that	we	require	assessments	of	legitimacy	for	all	sorts	of	institutions	and	that in making such assessments it is useful to think about how and to what extent institutions	act	wrongfully	and	so	potentially forfeit rights.	Claiming, for	example, that one of the institutions I cast as legitimate is in fact illegitimate already accepts the underlying	purpose	of	the	examples. To begin, institutions that do not violate rights are obviously legitimate. These are	just	groups	of	people	voluntarily	associating	without	harming	anyone,	so	interfering with	them	would	be	wrong.	Examples	would	include	a	private	social	club,	a	local	grocery co-op,	the	temple	on	the	corner,	and	so	on.	We	may	disagree	with	how	they	operate	and we	may	engage	them	in	dialog	or	even	protest,	but	they	have	a	right	not	to	be	coercively interfered with. We cannot physically bar members from meeting together or from carrying	out	their	institutional	roles,	we	cannot	threaten	violence	to	deter	them,	and	so on. These institutions are so anodyne that the question of legitimacy may seem misplaced,	supporting	the	traditional	approach	of	restricting	judgments	of	legitimacy	to political institutions. My interpretation is that these institutions are so obviously legitimate in	the	sense	we	are	pursuing	that	we	(almost)	never	explicitly	entertain	the question	of	their	legitimacy.	If	we	move	our	attention	to	institutions	that	are	prima	facie morally	suspect,	it	becomes	clear	why	concerns	of	legitimacy	are	appropriately	applied to	non-political	institutions.	Consider	four	such	institutions:	a	criminal	organization	like the mob, a maker of ultraviolent films, the Ku Klux Klan, and a golf club with racist 21	Jeremy	Waldron,	"A	Right	to	Do	Wrong,"	Ethics,	92	(1981),	21-39;	David	Enoch,	"A	Right	to	Violate	One's Duty,"	Law	and	Philosophy,	21	(2002),	355-384. 22 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, p. 182. Compare John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York; Columbia	University	Press,	1993),	pp.	427-428. 8 membership	policies.	All	four	are	morally	condemnable	in	a	variety	of	ways,	but	are	they illegitimate? The point at which wrongdoing results in the forfeiture of the right to noninterference	is	not	the	same	for	all	institutions	or	in	all	contexts.	Most	importantly,	it	has to	be	balanced	against	the	institution's	goal.	An	institution	that	is	uniquely	necessary	for a	morally	mandatory	goal	will	have	more	leeway	than	an	institution	pursuing	a	purely elective	goal.	There	is	not	much	room	for	rights	violations	when	pursuing	elective	ends. For	all	four	institutions	under	consideration,	the	institutional	goal	is	elective.	But I	think	there	is	an	important	difference	between	the	mob	and	KKK	on	one	hand	and	the film maker and golf club on the other. While the latter institutions are morally condemnable in important	ways, neither	directly	uses violence to	harm	others, unlike the	former	institutions:	the	mob	and	the	KKK	use	violence,	including	murder,	to	achieve their institutional goals. Just as people who use violence of this sort to achieve their private aims forfeit their rights against interference, these institutions forfeit their rights.	Both	the	mob	and	the	KKK	are	clearly	illegitimate. To	emphasize,	on	my	approach	this	means	the	mob	and	the	KKK	1)	lack	rights	to function	and	to	pursue	their	institutional	goals,	so	2)	others	correlatively	lack	a	duty	of non-interference, meaning that 3) it is permissible to coercively interfere with these institutions and their members, thereby preventing the members from coordinating their	action	by following institutional	norms,	ultimately	resulting in	the	dismantling	of the	institutions	such	that	they	no	longer	exist.23 These	implications	speak	in	favor	of	understanding	legitimacy	in	the	general	way we are pursuing. By identifying the mob and the KKK as illegitimate, we easily and accurately characterize the appropriate relationship between these institutions and outsiders	by	unifying	an important	set	of	practical stances	we	can take towards them. We	are	doing	more	than	condemning	individuals;	we	are	identifying	a	relevant	feature of the institution	as a	whole and coordinating	our responses around that institutional status. What	of	the	maker	of	ultraviolent	films	and	the	racist	golf	club?	I	think	both	are legitimate. Again, to be absolutely clear, this does not mean they are morally praiseworthy, or that we should not organize and protest against them, or that they should	not	reform,	or	even	that	they	are	not	violating	some	rights	and	acting	wrongfully (given the right to do wrong). Members of the golf club and employees of the film company	may	be	morally	condemnable,	but	we	cannot	use	coercion	to	stop	them	from carrying out their role in their institutions. Legitimacy only entails the very minimal claim that the institution has a right to function and so others have a duty not to 23 In the case of domestic institutions like these, the question of legitimacy	most often gets subsumed under	(although	is	not	identical	to)	their	legality.	A	major	function	of	domestic	legal	systems	is	to	establish shared and settled standards for legitimate domestic institutions like businesses or clubs, which then allows	us to	coordinate	our	behavior	around those	standards	and	gain the	goods	of stable	coordination over	time.	This	is	all	perfectly	consistent	with	applying	legitimacy	standards	to	such	institutions.	One	way of	thinking	about	the	issue	is	that	from	the	perspective	of	legislators,	we	need	to	consider	what	standards institutions	need	to	meet	to	have	rights	to	non-interference.	But	the	issues	are	still	distinct;	the	KKK	was morally illegitimate even when it was legal. This highlights a major reason why questions of state legitimacy	and	the	legitimacy	of	supranational	institutions	are	distinctly	difficult:	our	usual	solution	to	the metacoordination problem, namely the settled standards of a particular legal regime, is problematic outside the	domestic context.	We	need	ways	of assessing the legitimacy	of the	multitude	of institutions beyond	the	state	even	in	the	face	of	fundamental	questions	about	the	status,	normative	grounding,	scope, and enforcement of international law. This is further complicated by	my focus on rights violations, as some	rights	depend	on	political	institutions	to	give	them	determinate	content,	so	in	some	contexts	aspects of	moral legitimacy cannot be assessed independently of positive law. Thanks to Antoinette Scherz for helping	me	clarify	my	thinking	on	this	issue. 9 coercively	interfere	with	it.	Legitimacy	is	a	relatively	low	bar,	as	it	needs	to	be	to	serve its	practical	function	under	conditions	of	disagreement. This is not to say these institutions	would be legitimate in all circumstances. I follow Buchanan in holding that the details of how institutions work in their actual context	matters for their legitimacy	(his "ecological"	approach to legitimacy).	But	with the background conditions of a modern, relatively just state, institutions and institutional insiders have the right to act in some morally pernicious ways without coercive interference, just like individuals	have	a	right	against	coercive interference in their	private	lives	even	when	they	are	misogynist	and	racist.	It	is	only	when	those	views cross	a	line	into	sufficiently	egregious	rights	violations	that	the	right	to	non-interference is	forfeit. Even if you disagree with my conclusions in a particular case, the examples demonstrate the plausibility of the approach. It makes sense both to evaluate the legitimacy	of	institutions	that	are	not	political	and	to	think	about	legitimacy	in	terms	of	a right to non-interference that can be forfeit by wrongdoing. Legitimacy identifies an important	way that	we coordinate our practical stances to such institutions and their actions. III.	Political	Legitimacy This understanding of legitimacy has three important implications for questions of political	legitimacy.	The	first	implication	is	that	the	idea	of	political	legitimacy	as	a	single standard should be abandoned. Second, my focus on rights violations avoids some problems that have plagued normative evaluations of political institutions, especially international institutions. Third, the main issue for the legitimacy of many political institutions	is	their	use	of	coercion	because	coercion	prima	facie	violates	rights. First, focusing on the goals of an institution and whether it violates rights immediately	reveals	that	the	category	of	"political"	is	too	diverse	for	political	legitimacy to	be	usefully evaluated in any	unified	manner.	The	goals	of	political institutions	vary widely, from the broad and	morally mandatory goals of the state to the narrow and elective goals of institutions like the International Standards Organization. Some political institutions issue rules, use coercion to back those rules up, and wield the power to kill literally all human life, but most do not. Accordingly, the potential and actual impact of these institutions varies widely as well. No single standard could appropriately evaluate institutions that differ so substantially across the features relevant	for	institutional	legitimacy. Of	course,	there	is	still	room	on	my	account	for	standards	of	legitimacy	that	apply to types of institutions. But the types will be fine-grained, focused on the goals and functions	of institutions.	Plausibly,	one	of these types	would	be the	state,	given	states' common	goals	and	shared	ways	of	functioning.	Many	theorists	are	already	proceeding	in this more fine-grained manner by looking at the details of particular institutions or institutional	types	and	developing	novel	standards	for	them.	My	approach	unifies	these various	projects	by	giving	them	a	single	focus	in	the	form	of	a	common	understanding	of legitimacy: these different standards all aim to show under what conditions the institution has the right to function without coercive interference. But we should abandon	the	idea	of	a	single	standard	of	political	legitimacy. A	second	important	implication	of	my	approach	to	institutional	legitimacy	is	that a focus on rights helps us avoid certain conceptual and definitional morasses. Most relevantly, there is the question of	what it	means to rule (or,	what is often identified 10 with rule,	what it	means to be political).24 Some international political institutions do something that looks like ruling because they issue statements or decisions that prescribe actions for agents, like the United Nations. But these institutions do not coercively impose their decisions in the way that states do. Do these international institutions rule or not?	On some accounts of legitimacy this	will	matter a great deal, most	obviously	if legitimacy	is	conceived	of	as	the	right	to	rule.	If	these	institutions	do not	rule,	then	the	question	of	their	legitimacy	is	misplaced. On	my	account,	on	the	other	hand,	we	can	forego	the	question	of	whether	these institutions rule. Instead	we ask if their activity, whether it counts as ruling in some specific	sense	or	not,	is	violating	rights	and	how	that	activity	relates	to	the	institution's constitutive	goals.	The	question	of	rights	violations	is	independent	of	both	the	question of	ruling	and	the	question	of	coercive	enforcement	of	decisions. To see this, consider the case of a massively influential yet purely advisory institution. As an advisory institution it issues recommendations about how	everyone ought to live, but it does not take itself to be issuing commands and its recommendations	are	not	coercively	enforced.25	However,	almost	everyone	voluntarily does	what	the	advisory	institution	recommends	that	they	do.	Ultimately	this	means	that the	institution's	advice	drastically	shapes	society	and	people's	life	prospects. If one of those recommendations is that women should not work outside the home, then most women would choose not to work outside the home. But this also dramatically	affects	the	few	women	who	do	not	follow	the	institution's	advice.	For	they find	barriers	when	potential	employers	discount	them,	they	find	cultural	stigma	against women	who	do	not	follow	the	advice	and	related	resultant	stigma	about	their	abilities, they	find	a	lack	of	educational	opportunities,	and	so	on.	In	this	case,	the	legitimacy	of	the institution	is	in	question	because	of	the	effects	it	has	even	though	it	does	not	issue	rules in	the	strict	sense	and	even	though	it	does	not	coercively	enforce	its	advice.	The	fact	that almost everyone follows its advice and so society is structured in a way that systematically	violates	rights	is	enough	for	its	legitimacy	to	be	at	stake. My approach, then, appropriately raises the question of legitimacy for such institutions	without	having	to	solve,	or	even	consider,	a	thorny	conceptual	question	that other approaches	may struggle to resolve. This point extends to concepts other than ruling, including the particularly relevant concept of law. There has long been debate about	whether	international	law	is	"really"	law.26	International	law	lacks	some	features that are claimed to be constitutive of law on various accounts, such as the lack of a sovereign, the lack	of enforcement	mechanisms, or the largely voluntary subjection	of states.	On	my	approach	whether	international	law	is	really	law	does	not	matter	for	the question	of international law's legitimacy.27	What	matters are the	goals	of the	various institutions	of	international	law	and	the	ways	those	institutions	affect	individuals,	most 24	Many	theorists	grapple	with	the	notion	of	ruling	as	they	consider	legitimacy	in	the	international	context, including	Thomas	Christiano,	"The	Legitimacy	of	International	Institutions,"	The	Routledge	Companion	to the Philosophy of Law, ed. by Andrei Marmor, (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012), pp. 380-393; Tasioulas, "The Legitimacy of International Law;" Buchanan, "The Legitimacy of International Law;" Besson,	"The	Authority	of	International	Law	–	Lifting	the	State	Veil." 25	As	described, this institution	does	not command in the tradition	of	Hart	and	Raz, according to	which commands necessarily include the intention that subjects do as commanded because they were commanded to. Thus it cannot be described as ruling in the sense that this strain of the literature understands	it. 26 See, e.g., Hart, The Concept of Law, ch. 10; Joshua Kleinfeld, "Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law is Law," Fordham Law Review, 78 (2010), 2451-2530; Tasioulas, "The Legitimacy	of	International	Law;"	Dworkin,	"A	New	Philosophy	for	International	Law." 27	The	question	of	rights	violations	intersects	with	some	of	the	same	issues	like	the	lack	of	enforcement, but	it	can	be	evaluated	without	answering	the	conceptual	question. 11 especially	whether	they	commit	or	enable	rights	violations.28 Of course	evaluating the effects	of these institutions is incredibly	difficult, as is bringing	those	effects	into	relation	with	the	various	institutional	goals	and	determining what sort	of right to	do	wrong those	goals should support.29	The	point is	not that	my approach easily gives concrete answers. The point is that it avoids some difficult questions	that	other	accounts	struggle	to	resolve	and	that,	in	my	view,	distract	us	from more	important	issues. A third implication of	my approach for political legitimacy is that	much of our focus	should	be	on	how	institutions	use	their	power.	The	use	of	power	in	its	many	forms is	how	political	institutions	are	most	likely	to	violate	rights	and	the	most	egregious	and widespread	violations	of	rights	are	a	result	of	the	abuse	of	coercive	force.	This	is	not	a particularly	surprising	or	novel	position.	I	highlight	it	here	for	two	reasons. First,	this	puts	my	approach	in	the	camp	that	includes	John	Rawls,	who	notes	that political	power	"is	always	coercive	power"	and	takes	his	liberal	principle	of	legitimacy	to be	setting	the	conditions	under	which	such	coercive	power	is	justifiably	exercised.30	The other camp takes the	main	problem for	political legitimacy to	be	whether institutions have justified	moral authority, i.e. the	moral power to change others'	moral standing simply	by stating an intention to	do so.	The authority camp includes Joseph	Raz,	who frames	the	problem	as	the	question	of	"legitimate	authority."31 My approach focuses on coercion because it is primarily through the use of coercion	that	institutions	violate	and	threaten	to	violate	people's	rights,	so	it	is	the	use	of coercion that	primarily	delegitimizes. In contrast, claiming to exercise authority	while not	having	that	authority	does	not	violate	anyone's	rights.	It	is	only	when	that	authority is	coercively	enforced	that	rights	violations	are	possible	(or	when	it	is	widely	accepted so	the	coercion	is	structural	rather	than	interactional,	as	in	the	above	example).	It	seems to	me	that	focusing	on	an	institution's	claim	to	authority	leads	us	to	misunderstand	the relationship	between	authority	and	legitimacy.32 Consider	the	many	religious	groups	that	claim	moral	authority	over	all	humans. They	claim	to	issue	rules	(and	interpretations	of	rules)	that	bind	all	people,	such	that	not following	those	rules	is	morally	wrongful.	Is	every	religious	leader	(that	makes	this	kind of	universal	claim)	violating	the	rights	of	those	around	them?	I	think	not.	They	may	be criticizable	on	areteic	grounds like	respect.	But they	are	not	violating	rights	simply	by asserting authority over others, given that they	do	not force	people to follow them. If they	cross	the	line	from	exhortation	and	condemnation	to	coercion,	they	violate	rights. Analogously, the	main	problem for the legitimacy	of	an institution like the	state is	not 28	Cf.	Besson,	"The	Authority	of	International	Law	–	Lifting	the	State	Veil." 29	Note	that	the	question	of	whether	international	law	is	really	law	may	well	be	relevant	for	a	host	of	other interesting,	important	questions,	perhaps	even	some	questions	of	moral	evaluation. 30 Rawls,	Political Liberalism, p. 136. This camp also includes	Altman and	Wellman,	A	Liberal Theory of International Justice;	Ladenson,	"In	Defense	of	a	Hobbesian	Conception	of	Law;"	Robert	Nozick,	Anarchy, State,	and	Utopia (New	York:	Basic	Books,	1974),	p. xi;	Ronald	Dworkin,	Law's	Empire (Cambridge,	MA: Belknap	Press,	1986),	pp.	190-191;	Thomas	Nagel,	"Moral	Conflict	and	Political	Legitimacy,"	Philosophy	& Public	Affairs,	16	(1987),	215-240	at	p.	218;	Niko	Kolodny,	"Rule	Over	None	I:	What	Justifies	Democracy?" Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs,	42	(2014),	195-229	at	p.	197. 31	The	main locus of	Raz's thought on this is	The	Morality of Freedom. Others	who follow the authority approach include Green, The Authority of the State; Tasioulas, "The Legitimacy of International Law;" Higgott and Erman, "Deliberative global governance and the question of legitimacy:	what can	we learn from the WTO?"; Besson, "The Authority of International Law – Lifting the State Veil;" Christiano, "Democratic	Legitimacy	and	International	Institutions." 32 For more on why legitimacy and (justified) authority are not identical, see Morris, An Essay on the Modern	State, ch.	4	and	Bas	van	der	Vossen, "On	Legitimacy	and	Authority:	A	Response to	Krehoff,"	Res Publica,	14	(2008),	299-302. 12 that it claims	authority.	The	main	problem is that it backs	up its claims	with coercive force. There are further important and interesting	questions to ask about	both states and	religious	institutions,	including	whether	they	have	the	authority	they	claim.	Indeed, that	question	is	one	of	the	most important	practical	questions	people	face.	My	claim	is not that other questions are unimportant;	my claim is that they are distinct from the question of the institution's legitimacy. It is both consistent and useful to think that whether	some	religious	institution	has	the	right	to	function	is	distinct	from	whether	the religion	it	promulgates	is	true. The second reason that I am highlighting the important role of coercion in considering political legitimacy on my approach is that so far I have been treating institutions	of	all	kinds	as	if	they	were	purely	voluntary.	Institutional	insiders,	as	I	define them,	are	people	who	voluntarily	accept	institutional	norms.	This	may	have	struck	you as	odd	since	many	political institutions	demand	that	people follow	institutional	norms even if they	do	not	accept those	norms.	When those institutions	use coercion to force compliance	with	institutional	norms,	we	have	a	very	different	situation. The	voluntary	case	is	the	baseline	from	which	we	come	to	understand	the	nature of	institutions	and	the	core	of	institutional	legitimacy.	But	as	I	am	now	emphasizing,	this does not mean that coercion and non-voluntariness are irrelevant for institutional legitimacy-quite the opposite. Institutions that coerce compliance with their norms need to meet considerably more stringent standards for legitimacy because coercing people is prima facie rights-violating.33 At the very least such institutions will be legitimate only if they are necessary to achieve a	morally	mandatory goal. No purely elective	goals	could	justify	coercion	of	this	sort. Here the question of authority is likely to be relevant. Too briefly: on my approach coercion can only delegitimize if the coercion is wrongful. One way that coercion can be permissible is if a normative authority has changed under what conditions citizens	may be coerced. Any institution that uses coercion over as	wide a range	of	activities	and	on	as	many	occasions	as	the	modern	state	probably	needs	some kind of normative authority regarding coercion in order to be legitimate. But that is because	authority	can	be	relevant	to	rights	violations	and	the	permissibility	of	coercion, not	because	legitimacy	simply	is	legitimate	authority.34 IV.	State	Legitimacy Finally, my understanding of legitimacy can be consistently and fruitfully applied to states. This application is complex and I do not have the space to address the	many issues it raises. At this point I	wish simply to	make a preliminary and plausible case. Importantly,	my	general	approach	to	institutional	legitimacy	aligns	well	with	the	recent turn	away	from	political	obligation	in	theories	of	state	legitimacy.35 Understood	as the right to function	without coercive interference, the	question for	state	legitimacy	is	how	states	function	and	what	non-interference	in	that	functioning entails. While the function of states is much contested, most fundamentally states function	by	issuing	and	enforcing	laws.	This	is	what	enables	them	to	establish	the	basic 33	Cf.	Dworkin,	"A	New	Philosophy	for	International	Law,"	p.	14. 34 This opens the possibility that a state	may have the authority it needs to be legitimate yet not have anywhere	near	the	authority	it	claims,	as	I	believe	is	often	true.	Cf.	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the	Modern	State; William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority without Political Obligation," Law And Philosophy, 17 (1998),	43-60,	at	p.	60. 35	Examples include	Applbaum,	"Legitimacy	without the	Duty to	Obey"	and	Reglitz, "Political	Legitimacy Without	a	(Claim-)	Right	to	Rule." 13 structure	of	society,	provide	public	goods,	and	so	on.	State	legitimacy	on	my	view	is	thus a	right	to	issue	and	enforce	laws	without	interference.	The	important	question	is	what this	right	further	entails	given	the	peculiar	nature	of	state	functioning. I do	not	need to answer this	question	here	because	we can see some	plausible possibilities	by	turning	to	recent	revisionist	theories	of	state	legitimacy.36	For	example, William	A.	Edmundson	argues	that	state	legitimacy	should	be	understood	as	correlating to "a general prima facie duty not to interfere	with [laws'] enforcement" and "not to interfere with the bona fide administration of the laws of a just state."37 Jiafeng Zhu claims	that	state	legitimacy	need	only	entail	a	liberty	to	create	and	apply	law,	a	liberty	to enforce	the	law,	a	power	to	make	subjects	vulnerable	to	coercive	enforcement	of	the	law, and	a	claim-right	to	monopolize	the	three	former	Hohfeldian	advantages.38	Christopher W.	Morris	holds	that	"for	most	people,	this	right	to	rule	will	correlate	with	an	obligation to refrain from interfering with the state's actions."39 The important point for these revisionist	theories	is	that	state	legitimacy	need	not	correlate	to	a	robust	duty	to	obey	or even to	Buchanan's	weaker "special kind	of respect."40	They	demonstrate that various amenably	minimalist	approaches	to	state	legitimacy	are	already	extant	in	the	literature. This	is	sufficient	for	my	purpose	of	establishing	the	prima	facie	plausibility	of	applying my	general	account	of	institutional	legitimacy,	with	its	focus	on	non-interference,	to	the state. I	cannot	consider	the	many	arguments	made	by	Edmundson,	Zhu,	and	others	in support of a minimalist understanding of legitimacy and why states do not require more.41	That	said,	I	will	add	one:	any	legitimate	state	will	in	fact	have	all	the	support	it requires	without	anything	more	than	non-interference	because	all	legitimate	states	have de	facto	authority.	That	is,	every	theory	of	state	legitimacy	requires	that	the	state	have the voluntary support of most of the citizenry, such that most citizens voluntarily comply	with	most	laws	most	of	the	time.42	If	they	did	not,	the	state	would	have	to	apply stunningly	widespread coercive force in order to function.	But	wielding such coercive force is both	unacceptably risky to citizens' rights and	unlikely to be effective, so any state	that	needs	to	wield	such	force	in	order	to	function	is	ipso	facto	illegitimate.	When states have de facto authority, they will have enough resources to function without making	any	further	demands. This,	of	course,	dodges	the	question	of	whether	people	should	accept	their	state's broad	claims	to	authority.	I	purposefully	dodge	this	question	precisely	because	I	do	not think it is	well answered by a theory of legitimacy. This	marks one of the distinctive elements	of	my	account.	Often	the	question	of	legitimacy	is	bound	up	with	questions	of 36 I borrow the 'revisionist' label from Jiafeng Zhu, "Farewell to Political Obligation: In Defense of a Permissive	Conception	of	Legitimacy,"	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly	(2015),	doi:	10.111/papq.12128,	at p.	2. 37	Edmundson,	"Legitimate	Authority	without	Political	Obligation,"	p.	44. 38	Zhu,	"Farewell	to	Political	Obligation,"	pp.	3-4. 39	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the	Modern	State,	p.	216. 40	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights,	p.	184. 41	These	theories,	as	well	as	my	own,	are	intended	to	offer	a	theory	of	"internal"	legitimacy,	as	opposed	to "external"	or	recognitional	legitimacy,	which	concerns	how	outsiders	should	treat	states.	It	is	worth	noting that,	because	I	do	not	start	with	the	state,	I	use	the	terms	'insider'	and	'outsider'	in	a	different	manner	than the state-centric discussion. My distinction is about who willingly joins institutions; the traditional distinction	is	between	addressees	of	the	state	and	others.	I	am	offering	an	account	of	"internal"	legitimacy because	many addressees of the state are outsiders according to	my usage, and it is to them that the problem	of	legitimacy	as	I	understand	it	applies.	Terminology	aside,	the	important	point	is	that	I	take	noninterference	to	capture	what	many	citizens	of	modern	states	owe	to	their	states. 42 See Tom R. Tyler,	Why People Obey the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) for the argument	that	it	is	not	the	threat	of	coercion	that	motivates	most	people's	law-abiding	behavior. 14 good	citizenship, identity, loyalty, fairness, respect, and	a	host	of	other	moral issues.43 These are important issues and they are extremely relevant for how	we relate to the various institutions that	make claims on us.	My point is simply that they are distinct from	the	question	of	legitimacy. Notice that I am not claiming that the people who support the state, thus establishing its	de facto	authority, are	mistaken.	The	existence	of	a traditional	general political	obligation is	only	one	among	many	good	reasons that	people	have to	support the	state.	Many	people	contribute	to	the	state	out	of	a	sense	of	shared	history,	solidarity, personal loyalty, fairness, and so on. Some states may very well deserve these contributions	from	some	citizens for	precisely	these	reasons.	My	approach	does	not in any	way	exclude	those	possibilities. As I noted in section	one, on	my	approach legitimacy	picks out a single salient issue:	must	we	allow	this	institution	to	continue?	By	narrowing	the	question	we	are	able to focus on the relevant concerns more closely and without distraction while also inviting other	moral issues to be addressed independently. Of course,	we	might hope that legitimacy is	relevant in	some	ways	to these	other	discussions,	but	we	should	not treat	them	as	if	they	were	identical. Here I am following A. John Simmons' general strategy in "Justification and Legitimacy."44 Simmons argues that Kantian views of legitimacy like Rawls' collapse legitimacy	into	justification.	For	Simmons,	justification	is	a	consequentialist	assessment of the state that asks whether there are strong reasons to prefer the state qua institutional type over anarchy. Legitimacy is a	more robust assessment on Simmons' view: it applies to individual state tokens and asks whether they have the rights to direct,	to	coerce,	and	to	be	obeyed. I accept Simmons' distinction between justification and legitimacy but I go further.45	Collapsing	justification	into	legitimacy	disguises	important	moral	distinctions, as	Simmons	claims,	but	so	does	including	everything	else	in	legitimacy.	Simmons'	notion of	legitimacy	encompasses	a	host	of	different	issues	that	I	think	are	better	distinguished and evaluated independently. Simmons' ultimate concern is with political obligation, understood	to	include	a	variety	of	robust	requirements	like	generality	and	particularity. If we take legitimacy to be answering different concerns, namely about practical coordination	and	enabling	the	attainment	of	various	collective	goods,	not	about	political obligation	per	se,	then	it	makes	sense	to	answer	Simmons'	other	pressing	questions	on their	own	terms. Disaggregating the issues is particularly relevant for evaluating the idea of legitimacy	as	merely	entailing	a	right	to	non-interference.	One	concern	for	my	approach is	whether a legitimate institution could demand	more than non-interference if	more was	required	to	function;	if,	for	example,	a	state	needed	more	insiders	to	function,	could joining	the	state	as	an	insider	be	required?46	My	answer	is	that,	yes,	an	individual	could have	a	moral	duty	to	join	or	create	an	institution.	However,	that	duty	does	not	arise	from the institution's legitimacy but from an external requirement like justice. That is, one may	have	a	duty	of	justice	to	join	or	create	institutions.	But	what	explains	why	you	are bound to join is the duty of justice, not the legitimacy of the institution.	We need to 43	For	example,	respect	for	the	law	is	considered	by	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights,	p.	184	to	be	the appropriate	response	to	legitimacy.	Raz	also	considers	respect,	loyalty,	and	allegiance	with	respect	to	the law	in	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	pp.	91-99	and	The	Authority	of	Law,	pp.	250-261. 44	A.	John	Simmons,	"Justification	and	Legitimacy,"	Ethics,	109	(1999),	739-771. 45	In	case	there	is	any	question,	my	understanding	of	legitimacy,	while	weaker	than	Simmons',	is	also	not the	same	as	Simmons' justification;	my	view	applies	to	particular	institutions	and	includes	deontological elements. 46	Thanks	to	Tamara	Jugov	and	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	concern. 15 carefully	distinguish	the	various	moral	demands	that	are	made	of	us	and	their	sources.	I claim that legitimacy	plays a narrow role in our	moral evaluations of institutions and that	restraining	legitimacy	to	such	a	role	is	actually	a	strength	of	the	theory. To close I highlight two further advantages of a more disaggregated and minimalist	approach	to	state legitimacy.	One	of the	common	motivations	of	revisionist theories of legitimacy is that that they may allow us to resist the conclusions of philosophical	anarchists	like	Simmons.	Anarchists'	arguments	focus	on	how	implausible and	difficult it is to establish a general obligation to obey.	On	my approach, however, such	a	general	obligation	need	not	exist	for	a	state	to	be	legitimate.	All	that	needs	to	be established is that the state is sufficiently	non-rights-violating for it to	have	a right to function	without	coercive	interference. This is especially important in light of the	many piecemeal and individualized considerations that are insufficient on the traditional approach. For example, many people have promised to obey the state, like public officials. This cannot ground a general	obligation	to	obey,	but	it	does	explain	why	such	consenters'	rights	are	generally not being violated by imposition and enforcement of the law. Similarly,	many people may be subject to the state's Razian, instrumental authority. Such authority is too piecemeal to ground a general obligation to obey.47 But it could explain why many people	are	not	wronged	by	the	imposition	of	some	laws,	thus	increasing	the	chance	that the state is legitimate on my view because it is not violating rights as much as it otherwise	would	be.48	Once	we	start	to	gather	all	these	considerations	together,	it	may well	be	the	case	that	many	actual	states	are	legitimate	in	the	sense	I	am	concerned	with (although	most	states	are	not	owed	general	obedience,	as	anarchists	correctly	claim). Finally, minimalism about legitimacy results in more useful and plausible evaluations of legitimacy. Political philosophers have a very pessimistic view of state legitimacy.	According	to	a	rising	philosophical	consensus,	most	or	even	all	actual	states are illegitimate,	with the possible exception of a few Scandinavian states. This tide of philosophical anarchism	has pushed our field far from	other discourses of legitimacy, limiting	our	ability	to	fruitfully	engage. It is interesting to compare the philosophical convergence on legitimacy with legitimacy as it is understood in international law, for example. Philosophers tend to have very demanding standards for legitimacy combined with a very robust view of what standing legitimacy confers and what demands can be made of citizens by legitimate	states.	International	law,	on	the	other	hand,	has	the	pernicious	combination	of very undemanding standards combined with robust standing and robust demands. According to international law,	a state is legitimate	and	has sovereignty just in case it has effective	physical control over a territory,	which in turn grants it a	wide range	of rights. Many international lawyers, scholars of international relations, and political scientists tend to be very dismissive of philosophical approaches to legitimacy.49 Philosophers'	theories	are	criticized	as	unrealistic,	utopian,	and	naive.	One	response	to this is simply to scoff back, to maintain that philosophers' theories articulate apt normative standards regardless of	whether those standards are	met. This response is foreseeably	unproductive. 47 See	Besson, "The	Authority	of International Law	–	Lifting the State	Veil," for a valuable	discussion	of how	the	coordinative	aspect	of	Razian	authority	could	undergird	international	law. 48 On my view legitimacy is binary, not scalar. But there are many ways we could account for scalar assessments of legitimacy, for example in terms of how	much leeway in	wrongdoing an institution has before	it	loses	its	legitimacy. 49	See	Thomas,	"The	Uses	and	Abuses	of	Legitimacy	in	International	Law." 16 The approach to institutional legitimacy that I am pursuing here allows us to engage	more	directly,	and	hopefully	more	fruitfully,	with	understandings	of	legitimacy	in international law and elsewhere. My approach combines relatively undemanding standards	of legitimacy	with	a	weak	standing	and	weak	demands. Instead	of imposing severely demanding standards,	my approach asks us to	weaken our understanding of what	legitimacy	confers	on	institutions	and	demands	of	individuals.	Taking	my	approach would allow philosophical considerations of legitimacy to return to a more robust conversation	with	evaluations	of	legitimacy	as	they	are	made	elsewhere. In	conclusion,	I	reiterate	that	my	goals	for	this	paper	were	mainly	exploratory.	I have	shown	that	there	is	promise	in	approaching	legitimacy	from	a	general	institutional perspective, especially as we consider the legitimacy of non-state, international institutions. There is a coherent and useful notion of legitimacy that applies to institutions of any kind and asks whether they have the right to function without coercive	interference.	This	approach	to	legitimacy	may	not	only	unify	various	projects,	it may	also illuminate some	classic	questions	about the legitimacy	of the state	and	what sorts of demands states can	make of us. Part of this is due to the	minimalism of	my understanding of legitimacy, which opens further moral categories for independent, clear	evaluation.